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In July 2011, the Kauffman Foundation published the 
“Startup Act,” a menu of federal policy ideas aimed at 
promoting the formation and growth of new businesses in 
the United States. In addition to federal policy—which is 
preeminent on a number of issues—new businesses also 
navigate state-level laws and regulations. This document 
is designed to provide state policymakers with a similar 
menu of initiatives at the state level to reinforce any policies 
that promote entrepreneurial growth at the federal level. 
The fundamental premise behind these ideas, as well as 
this entire document, is that states and their citizens are 
better off encouraging the formation and growth of new 
companies, rather than pursuing the timeworn and cost-
ineffective approach of competing for the headquarters  
and/or expansions of existing firms (sometimes referred to 
as “smokestack chasing”). 
The menu provided in this essay is not offered as a 
“one-size-fits-all” prescription, but rather as simply a list of 
ideas from which state policymakers can choose and adapt 
to suit the needs of their particular states. Where possible 
and available, we note the empirical evidence relating to 
these proposals. But, for the most part, the proposals are 
new or sufficiently recent not to have a strong empirical 
base. They reflect, therefore, our collective judgment of 
what is most likely to work in terms of supporting new 
firm formation. States should thus adopt or adapt them in 
a spirit of experimentation, being ready, as entrepreneurs 
themselves would be, to refine them as they gain more 
experience, or even to jettison some ideas in favor of others. 
In the same vein, states and their citizens must become 
comfortable with the inherent messiness and turbulence 
of entrepreneurial growth: It is part of the process that 
Executive Summary
Research carried out or supported by the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation confirms that new 
and young firms generate a disproportionately large share of net job creation in the U.S. economy. 
However, even before the recession and since, the job-creating engine of startups (those less than 
five years old) has been slowing down.1 This not only is unhelpful on the job front, but, because 
major technological advances are disproportionately commercialized by new firms, it portends 
slower growth in living standards in the future if startup trends are not reversed.
1. For this evidence on declining entrepreneurship, see E.J. Reedy and Robert Litan, “Starting Smaller; Staying Smaller: America’s Slow Leak in Job 
Creation,” Kauffman Foundation Research Series: Firm Formation and Economic Growth, July 2011, at http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/job_
leaks_starting_smaller_study.pdf; Dane Stangler and Paul Kedrosky, “Exploring Firm Formation: Why is the Number of New Firms Constant?” Kauffman 
Foundation Research Series: Firm Formation and Economic Growth Number 2, January 2010, at http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/exploring_firm_
formation_1-13-10.pdf. 
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some new firms will grow, while others will die or shrink. 
On balance, however, the evidence is clear: Entrepreneurial 
growth is key to the growth of net new jobs and of major 
advances in living standards. 
We have organized the proposals by stage of 
the entrepreneurial process: encouraging and training 
entrepreneurs to take the often-audacious step of launching 
a business, measures to facilitate the actual launch of new 
ventures, and nurturing the growth of these new firms. As 
a guide to what follows, here, then, is a very brief summary 
of the policy suggestions fleshed out in greater detail in the 
body of the essay.
Enhancing the Supply of 
Entrepreneurs:
•	 Experiment	with	new	methods	for	speeding	up	the	
commercialization of innovations developed by faculty 
at state universities
•	 Create	new	health	insurance	options	for	entrepreneurs
•	 Cut	back	on	occupational	licensing	requirements	
(which inhibit the launch of new ventures), possibly 
moving to certification systems instead
•	 Expand	entrepreneurial	education	at	state	universities	
and community colleges
Facilitating the Launch of New 
Ventures:
•	 Reduce	the	administrative	burdens	of	starting	and	
closing businesses 
•	 Embrace	digital	firm	formation
•	 Implement	land-use	reform	at	both	state	and	 
local levels
•	 Allow	and	encourage	disruptive	business	models	in	
K–12 and higher education
Facilitating the Growth of  
New Ventures: 
•	 Closely	examine	and,	if	necessary,	change	policy	 
on non-compete enforcement
•	 Permit	credit	unions	to	make	limited	equity	 
investments in new enterprises
•	 Simplify	corporate	taxes
•	 Encourage	apprenticeship	programs	for	young	 
people in new companies
Fostering a Culture of 
Entrepreneurship:
•	 Welcome	immigrants
•	 Foster	networks	of	serial	entrepreneurs	and	 
third-party investors
•	 Promote	and	celebrate	successful	entrepreneurs
•	 Measure	entrepreneurial	progress
I. INTRODUCTION
To be legally recognized and to conduct business, firms 
must comply with multiple requirements set by state and 
local governments. Businesses must file for incorporation 
with state government; they deal with matters of location 
and office space that are shaped by state law; and they 
seek to hire talented workers, a factor determined by state 
educational quality.2 In this essay, we focus on how states 
can promote, directly or indirectly, new business creation 
and the inevitable “economic turbulence” that accompanies 
it.3 New firms enter the economy, challenging established 
companies; some shrink and some grow, some fail and 
2. None of this is to deny the highly important local dimension of new firms. Notwithstanding the distinction between companies serving local or  
regional markets and those that garner more national attention, each type of new business confronts matters of law and policy that are determined at the 
county or municipal level. We will address city and regional policy in future Kauffman publications.
3. See Clair Brown, John Haltiwanger, and Julia Lane, Economic Turbulence: Is a Volatile Economy Good for America? p. 3 (Chicago, 2006). Such 
turbulence “is the entire process of economic change: worker reallocation as workers change jobs and job reallocation from firms contracting and 
shutting down, to firms expanding and starting up.”
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some succeed. This is how economies at any level—
national, state, or local—grow over time and generate 
rising standards of living for their citizens.
Several variables that shape entrepreneurial activity 
are outside government’s control—natural resource 
endowments, geographic amenities such as coastlines, 
weather, and so forth.4 A state may be able to alter 
the relative utility of these assets, but the effect will be 
limited. Other factors, well within a state’s sphere of policy 
influence, also determine the climate for entrepreneurship—
this includes taxes, regulations, public goods, and additional 
quality of life indicators. This essay focuses on these policy 
measures, because they are levers that state officials  
can influence. 
Even with budgets under enormous strain, state 
governments are in a unique position to shape the 
economic future of the country through their policy choices. 
At present, the United States is slowly recovering from 
the deepest recession since the Depression, suffering from 
a combination of weak demand for labor and moribund 
housing markets, but with employment vacancies that 
cannot be filled either because firms are unable to find 
talented employees or qualified workers are unable or 
unwilling	to	move	to	where	the	jobs	exist.	Many	of	the	
things that will help ease these frictions are within the 
purview of states. The ideas in this report are not intended 
to promote uniformity—each state differs and should 
continue to experiment with policies and programs 
tailored to its specific circumstances. States should remain 
“laboratories of democracy.” But, we believe that a menu 
of generic policy ideas can be a source of broadly shared 
prosperity across state lines.
For purposes of clarity, we define “entrepreneurship” 
as firm formation and, while entrepreneurship is not the 
sole source of state economic growth, its importance for 
job creation and innovation merits special attention.5 While 
the relative impact of various public policies will differ 
among so-called “lifestyle” entrepreneurs, franchisees, 
and those aiming for growth and scale, there is enough 
overlap in their characteristics to suggest changes to state 
policy that will help.6	Most	companies	deal	with	hiring	
and firing and some form of real estate; all confront the 
process of incorporation and paying taxes and raising 
money to finance their businesses. We hope that some of 
the ideas presented here will increase entrepreneurship 
where it conceivably should be higher, while helping those 
entrepreneurs who begin with modest aims but soon realize 
their businesses have potential for growth and scale.7 
II. WHAT STATES DO 
NOW TO ENCOURAGE 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP—AND 
WHAT DOESN’T WORK
We recognize that, in writing this essay, we are not 
entering uncharted waters—state-level efforts to promote 
and support entrepreneurship abound. According to one 
4. See, e.g., W. Mark Crain, Volatile States: Institutions, Policy, and the Performance of American State Economies (Michigan, 2003).
5. See, e.g., Donald Bruce, et al., “Small Business and State Growth: An Econometric Investigation,” Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, 
February 2007. There is considerable leeway, of course, in how policymakers choose to define entrepreneurship and what types of new businesses they 
seek to promote. Peter Drucker provided what was probably the most straightforward distinction: “In the United States, for instance, the entrepreneur is 
often defined as one who starts his own, new and small business. … But not every new small business is entrepreneurial or represents entrepreneurship. 
… Admittedly, all new small businesses have many factors in common. But to be entrepreneurial, an enterprise has to have special characteristics over 
and above being new and small. Indeed, entrepreneurs are a minority among new businesses. They create something new, something different; they 
change or transmute values.” Peter Drucker, Innovation and Entrepreneurship: Practice and Principles, p. 21–22 (HarperBusiness, 1985).
6. Benjamin W. Pugsley and Erik G. Hurst, “What Do Small Businesses Do?” Brookings Papers on Economics Activity (Fall 2011).
7. In his study of Inc. 500 fast-growing companies, Amar Bhidé found that very few of them began with any ambition to grow, let alone rapidly.  
Amar Bhidé, The Origin and Evolution of New Businesses (2000).
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count, two-thirds of the states have created funds for proof-
of-concept	and	commercialization	in	bioscience	alone.	More	
than half maintain state-supported pre-seed funds, while 40 
percent offer tax credits for angel investors as well as public 
money for various forms of “locally managed, later-stage 
venture capital.”8 State-supported incubators are another 
popular initiative, as are small business development centers 
(SBDCs),	enterprise	zones,	and	various	entrepreneurship	
education programs at universities and community colleges.
Historically, these efforts have, to put it mildly, 
underperformed.9 This was well documented by economist 
Josh Lerner in his book, Boulevard of Broken Dreams, 
the title of which summarizes his main conclusion.10 It is 
easier, of course, to point to failed government efforts—we 
can count money spent, money wasted on boondoggles, 
and so on. It is harder to specifically quantify government 
interventions that enjoyed some success in encouraging 
entrepreneurship. These usually fall into the category that 
Lerner labels “setting the table” and unfold over many 
years, if not decades, with tangled lines of causation, 
multiple claims of credit, and uncertain lessons for others 
seeking to replicate the successful results. Discussing loan 
guarantee programs for small businesses, for example, 
which are popular across the country, Lerner’s diplomatic 
assessment is that they have a “mixed track record.” 
Success “hinges on a program’s ability to achieve a low 
default rate while providing loans to borrowers that would 
otherwise not have been funded.”11 The natural tension 
between these outcomes is not hard to spot. Lerner further 
observed that, because default rates often are higher than 
anticipated, “most guarantee schemes have not been 
sustainable without substantial subsidies.”12 That is, public 
money supports questionable loans and is then on the hook 
when default occurs.
What one inevitably concludes from Lerner’s book and 
other studies is that government efforts to boost business 
creation by underwriting private capital frequently result in 
underperformance, wasted money, unanticipated outcomes, 
and economic distortions.
Another popular action states take is the establishment 
of science research parks, with the expectation that 
firms will relocate there, startups will spring up, and 
innovation	will	overflow	into	the	surrounding	area.	Reality,	
unfortunately, is starker. In a review of two decades of 
science parks and federal funding under the Small  
Business	Innovation	Research	program,	Scott	Wallsten	 
found little effect: 
The	analyses	suggest	that	neither	SBIR	funds	
nor research parks have significant impacts on 
regional technology indicators. Indeed, the results 
seem	to	suggest	that	SBIR	funds	seem	to	chase	
success, rather than vice versa, while research 
parks chase failure (regions experiencing reduced 
economic growth) and do not generally reverse it 
… these results suggest that policymakers should 
think twice before implementing these activist 
policy measures.13
8. See Charles Ou, “State Programs to Promote the Growth of Innovative Firms in the United States—a Taxonomy,” in Giorgio Calcagnini and Ilario 
Favaretto (eds.), The Economics of Small Businesses: An International Perspective, p. 25, 46 (Springer, 2011).
9. See Alan Peters and Peter Fisher, “The Failures of Economic Development Incentives,” Journal of the American Planning Association, vol. 70, p. 27 
(Winter 2004); Alan H. Peters and Peter S. Fisher, State Enterprise Zone Programs: Have They Worked? (W.E. Upjohn Institute, 2002). 
10. Josh Lerner, Boulevard of Broken Dreams: Why Public Efforts to Boost Entrepreneurship and Venture Capital Have Failed—and What to Do  
About It (Princeton, 2009).
11. Josh Lerner, Boulevard of Broken Dreams: Why Public Efforts to Boost Entrepreneurship and Venture Capital Have Failed—and What to Do  
About It, p. 80 (Princeton, 2009). Others have similarly cast doubt on the effectiveness of loan guarantee programs. See also Simon Parker, The 
Economics of Entrepreneurship (Cambridge, 2009).
12. Josh Lerner, Boulevard of Broken Dreams: Why Public Efforts to Boost Entrepreneurship and Venture Capital Have Failed—and What to Do  
About It, p. 80 (Princeton, 2009).
13. Scott Wallsten, “The Role of Government in Regional Technology Development: The Effects of Public Venture Capital and Science Parks,”  
Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 00-39, March 2001, p. 26–27.
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Wallsten, as did Lerner, also looked at public venture 
funds and found “mixed success, at best.”14
Our own review of the literature examining small 
business development centers finds that they have 
never been fully evaluated. Our suspicion is that, if they 
were, they would likely be found ineffective. Likewise, 
research funded by the Kauffman Foundation performed 
a comprehensive review of all public and private business 
incubators in the United States. While incubators are a 
favorite tool of public policymakers, this analysis found 
few benefits—in fact, incubators served, in many cases, to 
subsidize firms that might otherwise fail.15 Another similar 
effort, the establishment of enterprise zones, also has been 
ineffective.16
Other studies have found that a state’s level of 
entrepreneurial activity is driven as much by non-policy 
factors as it is by policy and, frustratingly for scholars and 
policymakers, the influence of policy varies widely by state. 
That is, policy changes can have far more impact in some 
states than others, depending on demographic, historical, 
sociological, and cultural factors, which clearly are harder to 
measure and shape.17 
III. POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS
With this checkered history in mind, we have 
attempted to develop a set of policy ideas that either have 
shown preliminary success but have not yet been widely 
adopted, or that, on first principles, seem to offer much 
more promise than the failed or imperfect experiments 
already in place. To organize our thinking, we use a three-
part framework.
First, we consider policies directed at the supply of 
potential entrepreneurs. Second, we look at policies that 
facilitate actual business creation. Third, we focus on 
policies that can help promote the growth and development 
of companies. We also devote a fourth section to, for 
lack of a better word, cultural matters. The unifying idea 
behind these is for states to promote entrepreneurship by 
embracing and permitting economic turbulence.
A. Supply Pipeline: What Can 
State Policy Do to Expand the 
Supply of Entrepreneurs?
A continuing debate is whether entrepreneurs are 
born or made. It is not necessary to resolve this issue here. 
Although some people are born with more entrepreneurial 
tendencies than others, the challenge for policymakers 
is to support an environment that will nurture these 
talents, which are found in many people, whether or not 
they actually launch a business. In the process, states will 
maximize the numbers of people who try and are likely to 
succeed in forming new companies.
1. Universities and Technology Commercialization
Most	states	view	universities	as	engines	of	local,	
regional, and statewide economic growth. In basic ways, 
this is inescapably true: Universities, even relatively small 
ones, employ lots of people, own large swathes of land, and 
bring in money and talent from elsewhere. Less directly, the 
14. Scott Wallsten, “The Role of Government in Regional Technology Development: The Effects of Public Venture Capital and Science Parks,”  
Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 00-39, March 2001, p. 26–27.
15. See Alejandro S. Amezcua, “Boon or Boondoggle? Business Incubation as Entrepreneurship Policy,” at http://www.whitman.syr.edu/Pdfs/amezcua-
boonorboondoggle.pdf. 
16. See, e.g., Alan H. Peters and Peter S. Fisher, State Enterprise Zone Programs: Have They Worked? (W.E. Upjohn Institute, 2002).
17. See, e.g., Yannis Georgellis and Howard J. Wall, “Entrepreneurship and the Policy Environment,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review,  
March/April 2006, p. 95; Thomas A. Garrett and Howard J. Wall, “Creating a Policy Environment for Entrepreneurs,” Cato Journal, vol. 26, p. 525, 547 
(Fall 2006). The study found similar variation in the impact of policy with regard to highly entrepreneurial states: “Thus, while a good portion of the 
Western states’ primacy in entrepreneurship was due to their policy environment, high rates of entrepreneurship in New England states was achieved 
despite their relatively unfriendly policy environments.”
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knowledge creation that occurs inside universities has been 
shown over and over again to be a vital source of spillovers 
for surrounding areas, including an entire state.
Many	successful	entrepreneurs	emerge	from	
universities, sometimes as spin-offs that commercialize 
university research and sometimes through the licensing of 
technology to young companies. Yet, the system of moving 
innovations and ideas out of universities and into the 
marketplace where it can have an impact is highly inefficient 
and bureaucratic. In general, universities retain intellectual 
property rights from research funded by the federal 
government. While a substantial amount of university 
research makes it way into the economy—through billions 
of dollars in licensing revenues and “back door” activity—
there are good reasons to believe that the present system 
is suboptimal in terms of what could be achieved.18	Most	
notably, the technology transfer offices (TTOs) at universities 
exercise a near-monopoly over commercialization decisions 
and thus serve as a bottleneck in preventing more research 
and innovation from making it into the marketplace. A 
major concern in the United States right now is whether, 
in the face of global competition, the country can maintain 
a healthy system of innovation. By tying up intellectual 
property, universities are only compounding the difficulties.
The Kauffman Foundation’s federal-level Startup 
Act, released in July 2011, recommended that the 
federal government, as the largest funder of academic 
research, take steps to improve the process of technology 
commercialization—specifically, to permit university faculty 
members to retain the right to license the technologies 
they develop without having to gain approval from the 
university TTO. Universities still could retain the intellectual 
property in the technologies themselves, but the decisions 
to commercialize them should be driven by faculty inventors, 
not university bureaucracies (although TTOs can be  
useful in providing entrepreneurship training to their 
university faculty). 
State governments, either directly or through their 
influence over state regents who oversee universities, are 
in an ideal position to act on this idea without waiting for 
the federal government to move. States are critical because 
much academic research takes place in state universities, 
and because the flagship campuses of these state systems 
often have as part of their missions a responsibility 
to contribute to the state economy. We are mindful in 
presenting these ideas that there is a slippery slope in terms 
of government meddling in academic affairs, particularly 
at a time when many state institutions of higher education 
are under budgetary strain. Indeed, in many states, the 
flagship state school receives only a tiny amount of state 
funding anymore, blurring the public-private distinction. 
Without resolving these issues here, we believe two ideas in 
particular should be implemented by states.19
First, at a minimum, states should encourage their 
universities to adopt standardized license agreements 
for spin-off companies, which would “eliminate the need 
for potentially time-consuming and costly negotiations 
between university TTO staff, potential licensees, and faculty 
inventors.”20 A few places, most notably the University of 
North	Carolina,	have	implemented	this	idea.	Such	“express	
licensing” arrangements should be easily replicable.21 
Second, states should experiment with the free agency 
model of licensing we suggested for the federal Startup 
Act, and thereby speed up the process of breaking the TTO 
18. See, e.g., Robert E. Litan and Robert Cook-Deegan, “Universities and Economic Growth: The Importance of Academic Entrepreneurship,” in  
The Kauffman Task Force on Law, Innovation, and Growth, Rules for Growth: Promoting Innovation and Growth Through Legal Reform, p. 55 (2011).
19. These ideas are drawn from Litan and Cook-Deegan (2011).
20. Ibid. 
21. See Joseph M. DeSimone, et al., “Facilitating the Commercialization of University Innovation: The Carolina Express License Agreement,”  
Kauffman Foundation (April 2010).
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monopoly. Free agency would give faculty (and staff and 
students) freedom of choice in how and where to license 
their innovations. As a fallback idea, a state university could 
agree to give the TTO a first right of refusal to innovations 
over a period of, say, ninety days. In either its unrestricted 
or limited form, free agency should “provide much stronger 
incentives for faculty to commercialize their discoveries 
more quickly,” it could “encourage specialization and thus 
economies of scale among licensing agents,” and would 
likely give rise to arrangements no one can foresee.22 
But this is precisely the point: A market would replace a 
monopoly, generating innovation in licensing, and thus 
allowing more innovative ideas to work their way into  
the economy.
2.  Health Care
Many	entrepreneurs	who	launch	new	businesses	leave	
jobs at existing companies to strike off on their own. The 
supply of such entrepreneurs potentially is limited by the 
loss of health insurance. It is uncertain how many people do 
not start new companies because of such “job lock,” but 
a leading complaint from entrepreneurs is that they have 
difficulty attracting employees due to the same fear.23 
We cannot know at this point what the ultimate fate 
of	the	Patient	Protection	and	Affordable	Care	Act	(PPACA)	
of	2010	will	be	in	the	Supreme	Court.	Most	states	have	
moved ahead in starting to implement the state-level 
exchanges required by the federal law. When establishing 
their exchanges, states can request waivers from the federal 
government for experiments and customized arrangements. 
Whether or not the Act survives, one thing states should do 
is create some sort of “entrepreneurs plan” that is cheap, 
portable, and fungible. Some states could create additional 
small employer associations; at least one state we know of 
is working to decouple health care and employment. Details 
will vary by state, but creating new health care insurance 
options for entrepreneurs would go a long way in easing 
the	path	for	new	firms.	Even	if	the	PPACA	is	ruled	invalid,	
states should fill the vacuum by creating these plans for 
entrepreneurs and young companies.
3.  Occupational Licensing
Another potential supply chokepoint, and one that 
will vary by sector, is excessive occupational licensing.24 
In the United States, hundreds of professions and other 
occupations are licensed by states, with strictness of 
regulation varying by state. The median number of 
occupations licensed by states is eighty-eight.25 
Licensing has ballooned over the past several decades: 
The percentage of the American workforce covered by 
occupational licensing has grown from less than 5 percent 
in the 1950s to more than a fifth today. This reflects two 
trends, differing in intensity over time. First, there has 
been an increase in the number of occupations subject to 
licensing—or, more accurately, that seek state sanction 
for licensing. Second, a large share of employment growth 
in the United States, particularly in the last twenty years, 
has been in sectors and occupations already covered by 
licensing. This is particularly true for health care, where there 
is a “disproportionate prevalence” of licensing restrictions.26 
Licensing in health care is only natural; few patients would 
turn to an unlicensed physician or nurse practitioner. Indeed, 
22. Litan and Cook-Deegan (2011).
23. See, e.g., Robert W. Fairlie, et al., “Is Employer-Based Health Insurance a Barrier to Entrepreneurship?” IZA Discussion Paper no. 5203, September 
2010, at http://ftp.iza.org/dp5203.pdf. 
24. See Kauffman Foundation, License to Grow (2012). Morris M. Kleiner, Licensing Occupations: Ensuring Quality or Restricting Competition? p. 99 
(W.E. Upjohn Institute, 2006). Statutory licensing requirements typically include residency requirements, rules on reciprocity with other states, minimum 
exam score requirements, years of experience, and continuing education requirements. Occupations examined by Kleiner include physicians, dentists, 
teachers, accountants, barbers, and cosmetologists. 
25. See, e.g., Morris M. Kleiner, Licensing Occupations: Ensuring Quality or Restricting Competition? p. 99 (W.E. Upjohn Institute, 2006). State-to-state 
variation is considerable: Kleiner found that, in 2000, the share of the workforce covered by licensing ranged from 30.4 percent in California to  
6.1 percent in Mississippi.
26. Ibid.
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medicine is perhaps the best example of why licensing 
exists: to ensure quality and to reduce gaps in information 
between providers and consumers. 
But the aggregate impact of licensing, especially in 
other areas, is less clear—as the companion report by 
the Kauffman Foundation, License to Grow, points out. 
Increasingly, occupational licensing acts as a barrier to 
entry to innovative entrepreneurs and even established 
businesses seeking to provide quality services to consumers 
at lower cost through new business models.27 Even in 
medicine and dentistry, there are opportunities for loosening 
existing restrictions to permit nurse practitioners, physician 
assistants, and dental hygienists to provide a wider array  
of services. Loosening these restrictions would stimulate 
new entry, competition, and lower prices for consumers 
without sacrificing quality of service (indeed, quality may 
even improve).28 
For many other licensed professions, certification is 
an alternative to licensing that state policymakers should 
explore.	Certification	still	requires	practitioners	to	meet	a	
set of standards in order to receive a “right to title,” but it 
also allows non-certified people to practice the occupation, 
only without using the occupational title.29	As	Morris	
Kleiner notes, certification “maintains the incentives for 
individuals to invest in human capital but allows substitutes 
if consumers of the service perceive the prices rising relative 
to what consumers want.”30 A case study comparison 
conducted by Kleiner suggests that certification lowers 
prices without affecting quality. 
Even the legal profession can benefit from licensing 
reform, which the states are positioned to undertake 
because the practice of law is governed by state law. 
Specialized certificates (or licenses if deemed absolutely 
necessary) for particular routine legal services relating to 
personal (estate, divorce, bankruptcy) and some business 
(incorporation) matters would expand market forces in this 
arena, while dispensing with the need for individuals to 
devote three years of their lives to legal studies for which 
many are required to borrow huge sums that can take years 
to repay. As License to Grow documents in some detail, law 
licensing reform could save consumers billions of dollars  
per year, while offering opportunities for a new wave of 
legal entrepreneurs.
4.  Experiential Entrepreneurship Programs at 
Universities and Community Colleges 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the number of 
entrepreneurship courses and degrees at colleges and 
universities exploded. A tendency of many, if not most, 
of the introductory courses in these subjects is to require 
students to write a business plan that can be shopped to 
investors. While a business plan can be useful as a new 
company’s internal compass, it gives a person little sense 
of what kind of strategic adaptation is necessary to make a 
business work.
Fortunately, a new wave of entrepreneurship programs 
in higher education has arisen to challenge the standard 
course model. These new programs can be understood 
broadly as experiential learning, giving entrepreneurs what 
they need in real time to succeed. Successful models of this 
type	include	the	LaunchPad	program	at	the	University	of	
Miami	(since	expanded	to	two	colleges	in	Detroit	and	one	in	
North	Carolina),	the	Syracuse	Student	Sandbox,	and	StartX	
at Stanford. These programs, and more like them, have 
taken inspiration from for-profit startup accelerators like 
27. See Kauffman Foundation, License to Grow (2012). Much of the research on licensing finds that it restricts supply, drives up prices, and has little 
apparent effect on quality. It even has been found to exacerbate inequality trends because it leads to wage dispersion (between licensed practitioners  
and the rest of the workforce, a trend that is acute among physicians and dentists). Further, because it drives up prices, licensing holds more benefits for 
high-income consumers even while the net impact is negative for everyone else. See, e.g., Kleiner (2006). 
28. See Kauffman Foundation, License to Grow (2012).
29. See, e.g., Kleiner (2006). 
30. Ibid.
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YCombinator	in	California	and	TechStars	(based	in	Colorado	
with locations elsewhere), and pioneering educators such 
as Steve Blank at Stanford, who are at the cutting edge of 
entrepreneurship education.
What seems to set these new programs apart—and 
to the extent we can generalize about them—is that, 
rather than putting students through a traditional college 
course and anointing them “entrepreneurs,” they teach 
students and others to start companies by, naturally, 
starting	companies.	Many	of	the	programs	use	a	“just	
in time” model of service provision—providing student 
entrepreneurs information about the startup process only 
as they need it, similar to how fully-fledged entrepreneurs 
learn—and connect student entrepreneurs to local mentors. 
These programs have a natural geographic dimension 
because the educators and mentors—and often the  
outside investors, too—are locally based. In the  
process, these programs are helping to build regional 
entrepreneurial networks. 
State policymakers should promote and encourage 
experiential entrepreneurship education at all levels of 
higher education. We realize that the above list is not at 
all exhaustive and that schools across the country are 
experimenting with different types of entrepreneurship 
programs. Governors, legislators, and economic 
development officials can help by encouraging such 
experimentation and by being responsive when schools 
seek state support.
B. Entry Point of Business 
Formation: How Can States 
Facilitate Business Entry?
It is one thing to stimulate additional interest in 
entrepreneurship. It is quite another to make it as easy 
as possible. For a long period, the United States has been 
among the easiest places in the world to launch and grow 
a business. That is no longer true. Other countries have 
caught up. There is much the states can do to vault the 
United States back into the lead, not just to be ahead in a 
proverbial horse race, but because once individuals decide 
they actually want to take the risk of starting a company, 
the government and the legal system ought not to  
be obstacles. 
1.  Reduce the Administrative Burdens of Starting 
and Closing Businesses
Globally, the United States ranks fourth overall in the 
World Bank’s Doing Business rankings, but seventy-second 
in terms of how easy it is for new and young companies to 
pay taxes, and thirteenth overall on the indicator of starting 
a business, which includes procedures, days, cost, and paid-
in minimum capital.31 There is clearly much less variation 
from state to state in America than there is from country to 
country. Still, since the process of forming a company marks 
one of the first steps in an entrepreneur’s interaction with 
the state, policy changes likely can make a big difference 
here. When entrepreneurs have a choice of jurisdiction in 
which to incorporate, they look at things like how easy it is 
to file forms online, how readily they might later change the 
corporate form of their companies, and, overall, how non-
burdensome the process appears. 
Overall, we recommend that states do as much as they 
can to reduce the paperwork, time, and effort involved in 
the administrative niceties of firm formation. This requires 
an easy-to-use, “one-stop” place for business registration 
online and, ideally, as much consolidation of physical 
space for in-person registrations as well. Importantly, 
since business failures will accompany efforts to increase 
entrepreneurship, states also should make the shutdown 
and liability costs as low as possible.
31. See www.doingbusiness.org. Note that the test case used by the World Bank is New York City, so the ease (or difficulty) of paying taxes won’t  
necessarily apply to the entire country.
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2.  Land-Use Reform
An often-overlooked area of concern for entrepreneurs 
is that, even in this increasingly digital word, securing 
rights to a physical place to do business remains important. 
In the legal arena, this entails dealing with zoning laws, 
paying property taxes, and so on. While reforms in these 
areas can be accomplished only at the county or municipal 
level, because these powers derive from statutory law, and 
because states levy property taxes and some enact broad 
land-use laws, state policy still can help entrepreneurs in 
this broad arena.
Several states, for example, have comprehensive, 
statewide growth management regimes in place, which 
seek to “rationalize” land-use expansion, particularly in 
suburban locations. Yet, growth restrictions have been 
shown to limit regulatory innovation at the local level, drive 
up housing prices, and make new business formation more 
expensive.32 To limit these effects, states could implement 
any of the following ideas.
First, states should allow local governments to 
experiment with alternatives to traditional use-based 
zoning, particularly with land-use innovations that make 
property	use	easier	for	entrepreneurs.	Many	new	businesses	
enjoy locating in mixed-use areas, yet many land-use and 
zoning laws make it difficult for municipalities to mix various 
uses. Law professor Nicole Garnett, for examples, promotes 
“entitlements subject to self-made options,” devised by 
Lee Anne Fennell, that would allow property owners to buy 
the right to a certain land-use activity.33 This will help keep 
prices down and will allow local governments to respond 
more quickly to, for example, the spontaneous emergence 
of clusters of new businesses and what economists call 
“agglomeration economies.” Entrepreneurs, in particular, 
benefit from the fluidity, spillovers, and exchange 
of agglomeration economies. By contrast, “growth 
management may impede the network effects necessary for 
the next wave of innovation.”34 
Second, states also might curtail the ability 
local governments and private associations (such as 
condominium developers) have to put restrictions on 
home-based businesses. While the economic clout of 
these businesses, in terms of employees and revenues, 
may not be large, the sheer volume of them (two-thirds of 
sole proprietorships, partnerships, and S corporations are 
home-based) makes them potentially important for state 
and local economies.35 This is underscored by the small, 
but likely significant, number of home-based businesses 
that make the transition from non-employer to employer 
firms.36 Anecdotally, at least, many promising new firms 
begin as home-based businesses. Accordingly, making this 
path less burdensome could help promote broader business 
formation and growth.
These ideas also would help promote inter-
jurisdictional competition among towns, cities, counties, and 
regions. Such competition allows local governments to vie 
for residents and businesses and can benefit entrepreneurs 
by providing diverse location options and lower property 
taxes. Yet, many states limit inter-jurisdictional competition, 
32. Many of the points in this discussion are taken from Nicole Garnett, “Land Use Regulation, Innovation, and Growth,” in The Kauffman Task Force 
on Law, Innovation, and Growth, Rules for Growth: Promoting Innovation and Growth Through Legal Reform, p. 287 (2011). See also Edward Glaeser, 
The Triumph of the City: How Our Greatest Invention Makes Us Richer, Smarter, Greener, Healthier, and Happier (Penguin, 2011). Housing affordability 
shapes migration patterns, and the effect has been increasing over time. See Alicia C. Sasser, “Voting With Their Feet: Relative Economic Conditions and 
State Migration Patterns,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, vol. 40, p. 122 (2010).
33. Nicole Garnett, “Land Use Regulation, Innovation, and Growth,” in The Kauffman Task Force on Law, Innovation, and Growth, Rules for Growth: 
Promoting Innovation and Growth Through Legal Reform, p. 287 (2011).
34. Ibid. 
35. Henry B.R. Beale, “Home-Based Business and Government Regulation,” Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, February 2004.
36. See, e.g., Steven J. Davis, et al., “Measuring the Dynamics of Young and Small Businesses: Integrating the Employer and Nonemployer Universes,” 
in Timothy Dunne, J. Bradford Jensen, and Mark J. Roberts (eds.), Producer Dynamics: New Evidence from Micro Data (National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 2009). Roughly half of the original firms in the Kauffman Firm Survey were home-based. See www.kauffman.org/kfs.
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whether by curtailing local authority over land-use 
regulation or through other devices like mandatory fiscal 
sharing.37
3.  Digital Firm Formation
Once a company is incorporated, the founders must 
build a team, which is a critical issue, sometimes more so 
than the business side of the company.38 This goes beyond 
recruiting the right people and includes issues such as 
organizational culture and strategy, how to share the 
potential	gains,	and	how	to	structure	contracts.	Culture	and	
strategy do not—and should not—fall under the auspices 
of law and regulation (aside from issues of discrimination 
and harassment). But the manner in which a company 
organizes itself through contracts and what those mean for 
collaboration, innovation, and rewards is shaped by law. We 
consistently see, moreover, new and shifting arrangements 
in terms of how companies, particularly young companies, 
organize themselves and their networks of collaboration. 
State law can help by permitting digital firm formation. 
It is relatively simple, as some states have done, to 
permit filing, formation, and fee payment to occur online. 
But, as Oliver Goodenough explains, “The full payoffs of 
convenience and new possibilities grow from allowing all 
of the formal, legally mandated relations among owners, 
managers, and their agents to be conducted through digital 
means as well”39 (emphasis added). This would mean 
authorizing digital communication as the means for formal 
corporate action, and authorizing software “as the original 
means for setting out the agreements and bylaws that 
govern” the company.40
Drawing on his experience with the two states that 
already have taken this step, Oliver Goodenough has 
persuasively argued that states are “nowhere near to 
capturing the full potential of digitization.”41 Accordingly, 
states should change their laws to create the legal platform 
for digital firm formation and operation.
States can expect several benefits from digital firm 
formation. By promoting the commoditization of many 
activities through new software platforms, it may help 
bring down the cost—in time, money, and stress—of 
entrepreneurs’ interaction with the legal dimensions of 
business creation. It also may provide for greater scope 
in financing.42	More	broadly,	Goodenough	and	others	
anticipate an explosion of startup possibility: “If the 
collaborative mashup of ideas and talents among a group of 
people is a frequently recurring pattern for entrepreneurial 
innovation, then migrating the process to the digital world 
can open up an exponentially larger set of innovative 
possibilities.”43 States should create the platform for this to 
happen.
4.  Disruptive Business Models in Education 
State governments also may be able to promote the 
formation and growth of new private firms by exerting 
leverage over markets in which government essentially 
now has a monopoly. We have in mind principally K–12 
education. Not only is this market ripe for entrepreneurial 
disruption—it is also a big factor in the location decisions 
of companies and workers. Education and other factors 
often are more important to firms than small differences 
37. Nicole Garnett, “Land Use Regulation, Innovation, and Growth,” in The Kauffman Task Force on Law, Innovation, and Growth, Rules for Growth: 
Promoting Innovation and Growth Through Legal Reform 287, p. 304 (2011).
38. See, e.g., Martin Ruef, The Entrepreneurial Group: Social Identities, Relations, and Collective Action (Princeton, 2010). 
39. Oliver Goodenough, “Digital Firm Formation,” in The Kauffman Task Force on Law, Innovation, and Growth, Rules for Growth: Promoting Innovation 
and Growth Through Legal Reform, p. 343, 355 (2011).
40. Ibid., at 356, and Growth, Rules for Growth: Promoting Innovation and Growth Through Legal Reform, p. 343, 356 (2011).
41. Ibid.
42. “Digital management of the sale and transfer of participant interests creates the possibility of continuous equity markets in small company equity  
and debt.” Ibid., at 364. 
43. Ibid., at 362. 
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in taxes and incentives.44 Since it is likely that states will 
insist on trying to entice businesses to relocate from other 
states, they may as well compete on something that also 
can be a platform for entrepreneurship. Opening up the 
education sector to entrepreneurs by lowering barriers to 
the formation of charter schools, in particular, also could 
have a huge positive effect on a state’s attractiveness to 
other, existing companies.
We are not advocating the privatization of education, 
but the opening up to experimentation.45 Admittedly, 
there has been an enormous amount of innovation 
in K–12 education in recent years. The gains made by 
states in permitting experimentation and innovation 
here, however, have no equivalent in higher education, 
where they are needed with just as much urgency. 
It has become increasingly axiomatic that American 
colleges and universities, in the aggregate, enjoy stellar 
reputations but suffer from eroding foundations and 
falling performance across a range of indicators. This 
erosion has been adequately documented elsewhere and 
needs no elaboration here.46 We should stipulate, too, 
that we do not operate from a presumption that opening 
up higher education to innovation is synonymous with 
online programs or for-profit providers. What we are 
interested in is how entrepreneurship—new entrants, new 
models—within higher education itself can improve student 
outcomes, the indicator that matters most.
There is already a good deal of ferment and innovation 
occurring in higher education in the private and public 
sectors, as well as some hybrids and partnerships. Barriers 
persist, however: “On the one hand, the state has funded 
public institutions in a manner that has discouraged 
innovation, and on the other hand, it has tightened 
oversight such that it dampens experimentation.”47 States 
obviously are not the only overseers of higher education—
the federal government and private accrediting associations 
play prominent roles—but states can achieve or set in 
motion quite a bit on their own. An extended period of 
budgetary constraints provides not only a source of financial 
urgency to higher education reform but also opens up 
opportunities for innovation. Governors, legislators, and 
regulators should proceed with the following framework 
in mind: “Their goals should be to embrace the disruptive 
innovation, to focus on new measures to judge its quality, 
and to encourage innovation driven by improving student 
outcomes and lowering overall costs.”48 
States already have proved that they can have a direct 
hand in higher education innovation—two remarkable 
examples are the creation of Western Governors University 
(an online university catering largely to adults) and the 
branch	campus	of	University	of	Minnesota-Rochester	(a	new	
university that embraces both strong teaching and multi-
disciplinary interaction).49 The point has been made: States 
can encourage entrepreneurship in a sector heretofore 
protected or assumed to be in no need of innovation. 
44. “However, the costs of locally supplied labor are about 14 times states’ and local business tax costs. Regional variations in construction,  
transportation, and energy costs are often larger than variations in state and local taxes and, presumably, development incentives.” Peter S. Fisher and 
Alan H. Peters, “Tax and Spending Incentives and Enterprise Zones,” New England Economic Review, March/April 1997, p. 109, 111.
45. See Kauffman Foundation, License to Grow (2012).
46. See generally Ben Wildavsky, Andrew P. Kelly, and Kevin Carey (eds.), Reinventing Higher Education: The Promise of Innovation, p. 11, 39  
(Harvard Education, 2011); Clayton M. Christensen and Michael B. Horn, “Colleges in Crisis: Disruptive Change Comes to American Higher Education,” 
Harvard Magazine (July–August 2011); Louis Menand, “Live and Learn,” The New Yorker, June 6, 2011.
47. Dominic J. Brewer and William G. Tierney, “Barriers to Innovation in U.S. Higher Education,” in Ben Wildavsky, Andrew P. Kelly, and Kevin Carey 
(eds.), Reinventing Higher Education: The Promise of Innovation, p. 11, 23 (Harvard Education, 2011).
48. Clayton M. Christensen and Michael B. Horn, “Colleges in Crisis: Disruptive Change Comes to American Higher Education,” Harvard Magazine  
(July–August 2011), p. 42.
49. See John Gravois, “The College For-profits Should Fear,” Washington Monthly, September/October 2011; Kevin Carey, “The Mayo Clinic of Higher 
Ed,” in Ben Wildavsky, Andrew P. Kelly, and Kevin Carey (eds.), Reinventing Higher Education: The Promise of Innovation, p. 225 (Harvard Education, 
2011).
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One reform option is for states to allow and promote 
the formation of charter universities and colleges, akin to 
charter schools in K–12 education.50 This type of school 
would be free from many of the requirements that, among 
other things, help drive up costs. Nearly every single college 
or university adheres to a similar model of operations. 
A charter university, like a charter school, would be free 
to experiment with different ways of educating students 
and serving communities. Such schools, operating with 
autonomy and the freedom to innovate, would be the  
most direct way for states to promote new entry into  
higher education. 
States also should push institutions of higher education 
to be more responsive, flexible, and generally more attuned 
to the pace and requirements of entrepreneurial capitalism. 
The conventional icon of a college student—attending four-
year institutions, living on campus—is now a small minority 
of undergraduates. “Non-traditional” students—part-time, 
older, attending two-year schools—are the new norm of 
higher education. Yet, for the most part, many regulations 
and policies are geared toward the pop culture stereotype, 
which limits options for the vast majority of students and 
erects barriers to entry to those who aim to serve the latter 
group.51 Likewise, states should strongly encourage and 
incentivize differentiation in the higher education sector, 
which will spur innovation and pave the way for  
new entrants.52
C. The Growth and Development of 
Firms: How Can State Policy Help?
The best economic payoff—in terms of jobs and 
spillover benefits to other firms—from the formation of 
new firms comes when some fraction of them grow, ideally 
as rapidly as possible consistent with achieving sustained 
profitability.	Remarkably,	the	top	1	percent	of	growing	firms	
of all ages account for 40 percent net new jobs created in 
any given year. Fast-growing young companies (those less 
than five years old), or about 1 percent of all companies, 
account for 10 percent of net new jobs.53 An important 
challenge policymakers at all levels of government face 
is to increase the number of fast-growing job creators or 
to enhance the pace at which the most successful firms 
expand. Some ideas for how state policymakers can meet 
this challenge follow.
1. Talent
We know that a leading challenge for entrepreneurs 
is recruiting talent—this is a particular concern for growing 
companies.54 States can help in multiple ways, including 
fostering a supply of skilled, entrepreneurial workers and 
the mobility of those individuals. If one glances, for example, 
at the top and bottom of the Beacon Hill Institute’s state 
competitiveness rankings, it is quickly apparent that the 
main thing separating the most and least competitive states 
is their “human resources” component. This includes health 
50. “There is no public charter university in any state. Over a decade ago, then-Chancellor Barry Munitz invited the California State University (CSU) 
campuses to become a charter university where they would have increased autonomy and reduced regulation; not a single administration or faculty 
group wanted to move away from what was then perceived as the security of state funding and operation. Indeed, when California decided to expand its 
campuses for the UC and the CSU systems the institutional leaders and faculties chose to create institutions that were far more similar than different from 
what currently existed.” Dominic J. Brewer and William G. Tierney, “Barriers to Innovation in U.S. Higher Education,” in Ben Wildavsky,  
Andrew P. Kelly, and Kevin Carey (eds.), Reinventing Higher Education: The Promise of Innovation, p. 11, 23 (Harvard Education, 2011).
51. See, e.g., Frederick Hess, “Old School: College’s Most Important Trend is the Rise of the Adult Student,” The Atlantic, September 2011.
52. “A disciplined state legislative approach could force public universities and colleges to become more focused and better delineated, eliminating 
duplication, and speeding up the time to degree.” Dominic J. Brewer and William G. Tierney, “Barriers to Innovation in U.S. Higher Education,” in Ben 
Wildavsky, Andrew P. Kelly, and Kevin Carey (eds.), Reinventing Higher Education: The Promise of Innovation, p. 11, 35 (Harvard Education, 2011).
53. See Dane Stangler, “High-Growth Firms and the Future of the American Economy,” Kauffman Foundation Research Series on Firm Formation and 
Economic Growth, March 2011, at http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedfiles/high-growth-firms-study.pdf. 
54. See, e.g., Hal Weitzman and Robin Harding, “Skills Gap Hobbles US Employers,” Financial Times, December 13, 2011.
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and unemployment, but the most important factor is the 
education of a state’s workforce. Without exception, the 
most competitive states outperform the rest of the country 
on education factors, while the least competitive states 
underperform.55 
A reliable supply of talent is necessary, but insufficient 
either for growing companies or economies. That talent 
must be mobile—free to switch jobs, change companies, 
and start new businesses. Such mobility helps create what 
has been called a “high-velocity labor market,” and can do 
a great deal to enhance firm-level productivity in a given 
region.56	Many	states,	in	hopes	of	re-creating	Silicon	Valley,	
enact all manner of public programs to promote and help 
entrepreneurs, but leave in place a legal framework that 
adheres to a different model of employment. A state may 
excel at education or research, but have a moribund startup 
culture because labor market flexibility is limited.
One way labor mobility can be suppressed is through 
covenants not to compete, or non-compete agreements: 
agreements between a company and an employee that 
the employee will not leave and join a competitor or start 
a new, competing business. The reason this matters for 
state policy is that states vary in their enforcement of these 
legal arrangements, which affects the mobility of talent 
and ideas and, thus, a state’s economic performance. Some 
studies, for example, have found that full enforcement of 
non-competes reduces startup activity, patents, and venture 
capital.	Colorado	and	(famously)	California,	for	example,	
do not enforce non-compete agreements, while New 
Jersey’s enforcement is vigorous, which law professor Alan 
Hyde cites as a possible reason why states differ in their 
entrepreneurial activity.57 
Perhaps	the	most	compelling	research	on	the	impact	of	
non-compete agreements and state enforcement has been 
done	by	Matt	Marx	and	others.	They	point	out	that,	even	if	
the supply of talent in a given geographic area is adequate, 
startups still have difficulty attracting workers: “Unless they 
are content to recruit talent from universities or from the 
ranks of the unemployed, startups must attract workers 
from existing firms. Thus entrepreneurial regions rely 
heavily on fluid inter-organizational mobility of workers.”58 
The movement of workers between firms is concentrated 
particularly in new and young companies, underscoring their 
contribution to productivity and innovation.59 
It can be argued that, without enforcement of non-
compete agreements, employers will lose the incentive 
to invest in training their employees, thus leading to a 
general decrease in skills across an entire area. To the 
contrary, however, research has shown that non-compete 
agreements and their strong enforcement actually leads 
employees, when they change jobs, to move to different 
industries, which results in a downgrade of human capital. 
More	importantly,	economists	have	found	a	brain	drain	from	
enforcing states to non-enforcing states: “The brain drain 
appears to be more pronounced among the most productive 
and collaborative knowledge workers.”60 
As it pertains to the level of business creation—rather 
than the flow of workers to new and young companies—
55. Beacon Hill Institute, Tenth Annual State Competitiveness Report (2010), at http://www.beaconhill.org/Compete10/Compete2010State.pdf.
56. See Alan Hyde, “Should Noncompetes Be Enforced?” Regulation, Winter 2010–11, p. 6.
57. See Alan Hyde, “Should Noncompetes Be Enforced?” Regulation, Winter 2010–11, p. 6; Ronald J. Gilson, “The Legal Infrastructure of High 
Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete,” 74 NYU Law Review p. 575 (June 1999).
58. Matt Marx and Lee Fleming, “Non-compete Agreements: Barriers to Entry … and Exit?” in Josh Lerner and Scott Stern (eds.), Innovation Policy and the 
Economy, vol. 12 (2011).
59. See, e.g., John Haltiwanger, “Job Creation and Firm Dynamics in the U.S.,” in Josh Lerner and Scott Stern (eds.), Innovation Policy and the Economy, 
vol. 12 (2011).
60. Marx and Fleming (2011). See also Matt Marx, Jasjit Singh, and Lee Fleming, “Regional Disadvantage? Non-Compete Agreements and Brain Drain,” 
Working Paper, September 2010, at http://www.hbs.edu/units/tom/seminars/docs/braindrain100925.pdf. 
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the issue is less clear-cut. New businesses, because they 
are endeavors in uncertainty, require the ability to hire from 
existing firms, as noted above.61 But it is not clear that 
founders and early employees always come from the same 
industry as that in which they are starting a new business. 
We know that many entrepreneurs leave jobs at established 
companies—in the 5,000 firms tracked in the Kauffman 
Firm Survey, two-thirds had at least six years of previous 
industry experience.62 This means that many entrepreneurs 
likely will be starting companies that might compete with 
their former employers—or serve as customers or vendors. 
They have ideas, training, expertise, and networks, and 
this “entrepreneurial spawning” should be encouraged.63 
Yet, other research has found that, among fast-growing 
companies, nearly half of the founders had zero prior 
industry experience.64 Irrespective of an entrepreneur’s  
prior industry experience, however, new businesses will 
do better in an environment of worker mobility and labor 
market flexibility.
We are not prepared to recommend that every state 
simply cease enforcing non-compete agreements. Indeed, 
many states continue to alter their statutes regarding 
non-compete agreements and, for the most part, non-
competes generally are enforceable across states, with some 
variation as to what constitutes “reasonable” restrictions. 
What we recommend is that each state look hard at its 
legislative policy and judicial doctrine on the matter and 
make a calculated decision as to whether lax or vigorous 
enforcement will better serve its objectives.65 If a state seeks 
to promote higher entry by new businesses and help them 
hire and grow, then perhaps more relaxed enforcement is 
called for. If a state seeks to bolster the economic health 
of its existing businesses—perhaps because the state’s 
economy relies heavily on sectors with larger and older 
companies—then non-compete enforcement might remain 
appropriate policy.66 
2. Credit Unions as Potential Pieces of 
Entrepreneurial Communities
Entrepreneurs typically tap their own savings, credit 
cards, cash flow, and bank loans as their primary sources 
of finance, and the mix obviously varies. State governments 
cannot do too much to affect these sources, and those 
efforts that have been tried have generally proven 
ineffective. While we believe there is a great deal more a 
state can do, cheaply and more effectively, in non-financial 
areas, there is perhaps one financial institution that could 
play a larger role in helping entrepreneurs: credit unions, 
which we believe are generally under-utilized as financial 
sources for entrepreneurs. One reason is that the cap on 
their small business lending, for purely commercial (and 
risk-related reasons) is lower than that of commercial  
banks. Another reason could be that, in nearly every state, 
credit unions are not allowed to directly invest in young  
and small companies. 
61. See also Alan Hyde, Working in Silicon Valley: Economic and Legal Analysis of a High-Velocity Labor Market (M.E. Sharpe, 2003).
62. See Janice Ballou, et al., “The Kauffman Firm Survey: Results from the Baseline and First Follow-Up Surveys,” March 2008.
63. Paul Gompers, Josh Lerner, and David Scharfstein, “Entrepreneurial Spawning: Public Corporations and the Genesis of New Ventures, 1986–1999,” 
Journal of Finance, vol. 60, p. 577 (April 2005).
64. See, e.g., Amar Bhidé, The Origin and Evolution of New Businesses (Oxford, 2000).
65. Marx and Fleming, for example, point out that some states exempt certain sectors or occupations from non-competes. See Matt Marx and Lee 
Fleming, “Non-compete Agreements: Barriers to Entry … and Exit?” in Josh Lerner and Scott Stern (eds.), Innovation Policy and the Economy, vol. 12 
(2011).
66. “Entry is less likely to occur given non-competes because would-be founders find it more difficult to start companies in the same industry. Moreover, 
even once founded it is more difficult for nascent ventures to attract talent from companies that use non-competes because they are less able to reliably 
promise to mount a defense against a lawsuit from the former employer. Thus policymakers whose aim is a robust entrepreneurial ecosystem may be less 
sympathetic to non-competes, whereas those interested in sustaining existing firms in their regions will likely look upon such contracts more favorably.” 
Matt Marx and Lee Fleming, “Non-compete Agreements: Barriers to Entry … and Exit?” in Josh Lerner and Scott Stern (eds.), Innovation Policy and the 
Economy, vol. 12 (2011).
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We recommend that states consider raising the lending 
cap as well as allowing credit unions to take equity stakes 
in entrepreneurial companies (subject to an overall asset 
cap, especially as equity investments generally are illiquid). 
We realize that it may not be possible, legally or as a 
practical matter, for employer-based credit unions to foster 
entrepreneurship, which would mean facilitating the exit 
of employees, and thus credit union members, from the 
firm and the credit union. But credit unions with broader, 
community memberships could prove to be key players in 
building entrepreneurial communities. 
3.  Taxes
At first glance, it would appear that the relationship 
between taxes, both personal and corporate, and 
entrepreneurship should be clear-cut. If business founders 
are permitted to keep more of what they earn, more people 
should be motivated to start growing companies.
In reality, however, the empirical evidence on 
the relationship between taxes and entrepreneurship 
is mixed, as suggested in a review of literature on 
entrepreneurship and taxes by highly regarded economist 
and entrepreneurship expert William Baumol and his 
colleagues. Some studies find that higher marginal tax rates 
will stimulate entrepreneurship (perhaps because it is easier 
to claim what otherwise would be expenses as business 
deductions or, as some economists claim, to hide income 
in self-employment), while others focus on the disparity 
between income and corporate taxes. Still more find little 
relationship between business taxes and investment.67 
Baumol and his colleagues recommend “a regressive 
business tax in which the firm is subjected to a lower tax 
rate the faster the percentage rate of growth of its output 
and sales.”68	Past	a	certain	point,	reductions	in	taxes	also	
will undermine the public goods, such as infrastructure 
and educational systems, that are just as important to 
entrepreneurs and their employees.69 
What a state must avoid are taxes and regulations 
that distort business activity by favoring one sector over 
another. Tax credits and incentive programs do just this, 
distorting the environment not only for new and young 
firms but for all other companies in the state as well—costs 
are shifted as the tax base narrows.70 Yet, nearly every state 
offers business tax incentives: At last count, forty-one states 
offered corporate income tax exemptions, forty-five offered 
tax incentives for job creation, and forty-nine allowed sales 
and use tax exemptions on new equipment.71 
The total tax burden in a state is probably less 
important than the type and structure of taxes.72 In 
particular, some studies have shown that property taxes 
have a negative impact on new businesses because they 
must be paid irrespective of company performance.73  
But states also have converged in how they raise revenue. 
67. William J. Baumol, et al., “Innovative Entrepreneurship and Policy: Toward Initiation and Preservation of Growth,” in Giorgio Calcagnini and Ilario 
Favaretto (eds.), The Economics of Small Businesses: An International Perspective, p. 3 (Springer, 2011).
68. Ibid., at 17 (“This arrangement clearly would not be unfair to small firms, for which a given percentage increase in sales may be easier to achieve 
than it is for a firm that already has a large share of the market. Yet such a tax also would provide an incentive for enhanced investment, and lead to a 
shift in investment from markets and industries with low growth prospects into others where the opportunities for growth are greater.”)
69. Importantly, “lower taxes obtained by increased government efficiency would be expected to have beneficial effects.” Stephan J. Goetz, et al., 
“Sharing the gains of local economic growth: race-to-the-top versus race-to-the-bottom economic development,” Environment and Planning C: 
Government and Policy, p. 428, 446 (2011).
70. “If a state needs to offer such packages, it is most likely covering for a woeful business tax climate.” Kail M. Padgitt, “2011 State Business Tax Climate 
Index,” Tax Foundation, Background Paper No. 60, October 2010. One study found that tax assistance programs are associated with lower rates of job 
growth. See Stephan J. Goetz, et al. (2011). 
71. See Jennifer Burnett, State Business Incentives: Trends and Options for the Future, Council of State Governments, October 2011.
72. “While it is unquestionably important how much revenue states collect in business taxes, the manner in which they extract tax revenue is also  
important.” Kail M. Padgitt, “2011 State Business Tax Climate Index,” Tax Foundation, Background Paper No. 60, October 2010. 
73. Timothy J. Bartik, “Small Business Start-Ups in the United States: Estimates of the Effects of Characteristics of States,” Southern Economic Journal 
(1989); Kail M. Padgitt, “2011 State Business Tax Climate Index,” Tax Foundation, Background Paper No. 60, October 2010.
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In the last three decades of the twentieth century, nearly 
every state increased its reliance on individual income 
taxes relative to sales taxes, even though sales taxes 
still constitute the bulk of state tax revenue. The most 
divergence among states is on corporate income taxes—
even though such taxes only raise a small amount of 
revenue compared to individual income and sales taxes, the 
variability from state to state likely makes large differences 
to businesses.
Corporate	income	taxes,	in	addition	to	being	more	
variable from state to state, also have a more plausible 
impact on entrepreneurship. Again, though, evidence is 
mixed because of myriad credits and exemptions that states 
grant, the differential performance of young companies in 
terms of net income (on which most, but not all, types of 
corporate taxes are levied), and the rapid growth over the 
past decade and a half in the use of the limited liability 
company form.74	Researchers	have	found,	moreover,	that	
it is not necessarily the marginal rate level that negatively 
affects firms, but complexity due to credits and exemptions. 
The effect of a complex corporate tax structure is that it 
drives up compliance costs and introduces distortions if 
there are multiple layers of applicability, creating inequities 
in how different firms are taxed.75 Some research also has 
found that states offering more corporate tax incentives and 
credits tend to have unwieldy and unfriendly tax structures 
in the first place. 
The best option, in our view, is to pursue simplicity and 
a wide base in the corporate income tax structure. Simplicity 
and a wide base are particularly important for young, 
growing companies, on whom greater complexity and more 
distortions will inflict a higher burden of compliance. 76
5. Apprenticeships
Many	states	already	fund	a	variety	of	internship	
programs for students. But there is a perpetual gap in 
exposing students to new and young companies, on one 
hand, and on the other, those companies’ need to find and 
recruit talent. States should create, through high schools, 
vocational schools, community colleges, and universities, 
apprenticeships for students in new and young companies. 
We call these apprenticeships rather than internships 
because they will specifically aim to expose students to the 
idea of entrepreneurship and the experience of working 
in that environment. They will act as another type of 
entrepreneurship education program.
D. Culture: What Else Can  
States Do?
Finally, although it is difficult to measure, local 
culture—molded by norms and institutions—can have a 
powerful effect on individuals’ propensity for wanting to be 
entrepreneurs	or	working	for	startups.	Moreover,	success	
begets success, so that a positive entrepreneurial culture 
is self-reinforcing, while, conversely, a big-firm culture can 
be inimical to the formation and growth of new companies 
(though not always, because big firms buy from startups 
and, if the legal environment permits, some of the best 
entrepreneurs once worked for larger enterprises).
Culture	is	difficult	for	policymakers	to	directly	affect.	
Nonetheless, state policymakers can do certain things to 
nudge matters in the right direction. 
1.  Welcome Immigrants
Immigrant entrepreneurs have been enormously 
important to the American economy. From 1995 to 2006, 
74. The owners of an LLC can choose how they would like to be taxed: as a partnership, in which business income passes through to the owners as 
personal income and so is not subject to double taxation, or as corporate income. Some researchers have found that the proliferation of LLCs helps 
account for the falling levels of state corporate income tax revenues. See, e.g., William F. Fox and LeAnn Luna, “Do Limited Liability Companies Explain 
Declining State Corporate Tax Revenues?, p. 33, Public Finance Review 690 (2005).
75. See, e.g., Jed Kolko, David Neumark, and Marisol Cueller Mejia, “Public Policy, State Business Climates, and Economic Growth,” National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper 16968, April 2011.
76. See, e.g., Donald Bruce and John Deskins, “Can State Tax Policies be Used to Promote Entrepreneurial Activity?” Small Business Economics (2010).
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for example, immigrants founded or co-founded one-
quarter of all technology and engineering companies 
in the country.77 These immigrant firms comprised less 
than 1 percent of all companies founded during this 
period, yet accounted for close to 10 percent of job 
creation. Immigration policy clearly raises issues relating 
to federal preemption, but more than one state in recent 
years has taken immigration matters into its own hands. 
These attempts have dealt almost exclusively with illegal 
immigration, proving that states can take actions to make 
themselves less attractive to immigrants of all kinds, 
including those who would start companies and create jobs. 
State policy options obviously are limited here, but 
there is nothing to stop a state from branding itself as 
immigrant-friendly, as one that is welcoming to immigrants 
who study in public universities, start companies, and so on. 
In particular, state officials—from the governor on down—
can host meetings of immigrant entrepreneurs and make 
it known that the state values them and their connections, 
both	inside	and	outside	the	United	States.	Moreover,	in	
addition to outreach programs in foreign countries that 
promote tourism, products, and services provided by 
firms located in their states, state officials also can reach 
out to potential immigrants to let them know that their 
states welcome them if they come. Being able to connect 
immigrant entrepreneurs to local networks of immigrants 
also can help make these immigrants feel more “at home” 
in a state even before they arrive, or as they are considering 
where to live.
2. Foster Networks of Entrepreneurs and  
Their Funders
Many	would-be	entrepreneurs	think	money	is	the	
most important key to their success, but a growing body of 
evidence confirms that it is their access to networks—of 
other entrepreneurs, potential employees, potential funders, 
and service providers (such as lawyers and accountants 
experienced in assisting startups)—that is perhaps the 
most important factor that will determine their future 
success.78	Recent	work	by	Ted	Zoller	shows	that	networks	of	
serial entrepreneurs or funders—are especially important, 
because entrepreneurial “players” refer deals to one 
another, form partnerships, and often help each other. Areas 
where	these	networks	are	“thick”—such	as	Silicon	Valley	
and San Diego—not surprisingly are also locations where 
entrepreneurial activity is “hot.”79 
State officials—especially governors—can facilitate 
the formation and nurturing of these networks. Such simple 
steps as organizing regular dinners or breakfasts of key 
entrepreneurial players to ensure that they each know one 
another can go a long way toward creating and/or nurturing 
these networks. 
3. Celebrate Examples
Governors and legislators, who have high public 
visibility in their states, should use it to celebrate examples 
of successful entrepreneurs and role models for aspiring 
entrepreneurs. It is difficult to measure the zeitgeist of a 
location, but every entrepreneurial community in the United 
States has a stable of stories that get told over and over 
77. See Vivek Wadhwa et al., “America’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs, Part II,” Kauffman Foundation, June 3, 2007, at http://www.kauffman.org/upload-
edfiles/entrep_immigrants_2_61207.pdf. 
78. See, e.g., Toby E. Stuart & Olav Sorenson, “Strategic Networks and Entrepreneurial Ventures,” Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, vol. 1, no. 3 
(December 2007), p. 211–227.
79. Ted Zoller, of the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill and the Kauffman Foundation, has conducted this research into networks of what he calls 
dealmakers, creating a “Dealmakers Algorithm.” See, e.g., “Funding New Ventures: One-on-One with Ted Zoller,” at http://www.kenaninstitute.unc.edu/
news/zoller.htm; Danny Schreiber, “Using His Dealmaker’s Algorithm, Ted Zoller, Ph.D. Helps Entrepreneurs,” Silicon Prairie News, June 23, 2010, at 
http://www.siliconprairienews.com/2010/06/using-his-dealmaker-s-algorithm-ted-zoller-ph-d-helps-entrepreneurs. 
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again and become a shared narrative. This helps perpetuate 
the idea that entrepreneurship is an accepted pursuit. 
But entrepreneurs, even successful ones, sometimes are 
invisible to the general public. If residents see state officials 
highlighting entrepreneurship and those engaged in starting 
companies, it immediately will help shape that  
state’s culture.
4. Measurement
One of the most important, if least sexy, things a state 
can do is to improve the measurement and tracking of new 
businesses and their development. Numerous datasets 
already exist, but they all have their own shortcomings. 
Plenty	of	room	for	innovation	exists	in	this	area.	Traditional	
economic development efforts have been plagued by 
inappropriate counting techniques and difficulty in assessing 
a program’s success or failure. Better, more detailed metrics 
also would give policymakers at all levels a good idea of 
their progress in promoting entrepreneurship.
Such a dashboard would include: new firm formation; 
firm survival and exit; sector and sub-sector breakdowns 
matched	to	federal	NAICS	codes;	job	growth	and	loss;	
geographic breakdown at the state, metropolitan area, 
and possibly county levels; commercialization of university 
research (licenses, spin-outs); investment in companies by 
type (venture capital, angel investors, corporate venture, 
etc.); and so on. One leader we have found in this regard 
is	the	Missouri	Economic	Research	and	Information	Center	
(MERIC).80 While the potential for improvement in data 
collection	is	likely	infinite,	MERIC	does	an	admirable	job	
tracking new business formation, job growth, and fast-
growing companies.
IV. CONCLUSION
If there can be said to be a consensus regarding public 
policy and entrepreneurship, whether among economists 
or entrepreneurs, it is that the process of turbulence should 
be allowed to proceed uninterrupted—firms starting and 
failing, hiring and firing people, and so on.81 This process is 
the essence of productivity gains. Such a consensus explains 
why things like science parks, traditional incubators, and 
targeted tax incentives historically have experienced modest 
and negative outcomes. It also explains why ideas such as 
relaxed enforcement of non-compete agreements, eased 
occupational licensing, and land-use reform might go a 
long way toward promoting entrepreneurship in a state. 
The vitality of economy comes not only from the creativity, 
but also from the creative destruction—what Joseph 
Schumpeter termed almost a century ago. 
 
This document was primarily drafted by Kauffman Foundation 
researchers	Dane	Stangler,	Robert	Litan,	and	Yasuyuki	Motoyama,	
with helpful input from other Kauffman associates.
80. See http://www.missourieconomy.org.
81. See, e.g., Peter A. Zaleski, “Start-Ups and External Equity: The Role of Entrepreneurial Experience,” Business Economics, vol. 46, p. 43 (January 2011).
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